Apple Reference & Presen…rary 8 (Internal Edition)/Apple R&P Lib Internal v8.0.iso/3-Presentations/Apple Computer Inc./Industry Competition/ROMs/Software/Mac OS⁄2 pt. 5

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pt. 5

Apple confidential

Appendix A:  Comparison of Macintosh System 7.0 vs. OS/2

Features of a Macintosh running System 7.0 vs. OS/2 1.2 Standard Edition on a
PC compatible.

FeatureMacintosh + System 7PC compatible + OS/2 1.2 Std. Ed.
Apple and Microsoft    68000 & up  80286 or 80386
recommended configuration  2 MB RAM4 MB RAM
   20 MB Hard disk 40 MB Hard disk
Graphical interface4   4
Metaphor-based interface   4
Multitasking   4   4
Multithreading 4
Virtual Memory 4   4
Memory protection  4
Interapplication communication 4   4
Run DOS programs   4   4
Thousands of applications  4
Group computing
   Built-in networking 4
   Serverless file-sharing 4
   Database access manager 4
   Communications toolbox  4   2
File management
   Full-length file names  4   4
   Aliases 4
   Search/Find 4   4
   Metaphor-based interface4
Graphics
   # of colors standard256 16
   Outline fonts   4   4
Multimedia
   Sound manager   4
   Time manager4
Utilities
   HyperCard   4
   Built-in help   4   4
   Macro recorder  4
Other features
   Floating-point coprocessor  4
   Bundled mouse   4
   Bundled operating system4
   SCSI connector  4
   Multiple monitor support4
   Read DOS, Mac, Apple II disks   4
   Auto-mount floppy drives4
   Soft power  4
Appendix B:  IBM/Microsoft’s Positioning of OS/2

Microsoft and IBM are positioning OS/2 differently.  IBM is attempting to
position OS/2 as the strategic operating system for most personal computers
because OS/2 is part of its SAA strategy for tying together incompatible IBM
hardware.  Although Microsoft supports IBM’s positioning of OS/2 officially, it
is becoming evident that Microsoft actually wants Windows to increase its
popularity in the short term, even at the expense of OS/2.  One of the key
reasons Microsoft is now pushing Windows may be that it suspects that only
Windows—and not OS/2—can gain significant market share against the competing
environments (DOS and Macintosh).  And Microsoft deeply wants one of its
graphical interfaces to succeed.  Another reason Microsoft wants Windows to
succeed is that it offers applications for Windows (Excel and Word) but its key
competitors don’t.  Lotus and WordPerfect have instead been developing for
OS/2.  Therefore, if Windows succeeds in the short term, then Microsoft’s
applications will face less competition and are likely to become dominant
applications.  This will provide Microsoft with increased revenue, as well as
giving its applications momentum if and when the market finally moves to OS/2.


IBM/Microsoft’s COMDEX announcement

The COMDEX announcement is an example of IBM/Microsoft promoting the importance
of OS/2 very heavily.

Windows vs. OS/2—the winner is OS/2.  At the start of Fall Comdex, Microsoft
and IBM released a statement clarifying the relationship between OS/2 and
Windows, and giving more details on the future of OS/2.  The statement
strengthens the position of OS/2, assigning Windows to price-sensitive users
and those with limited hardware.  Implicitly, OS/2 is also now a 386-only
operating system.

The most important element of the announcement is that Microsoft and IBM have
now formally split the PC operating environments into two incompatible
segments.  Some PC customers, especially business purchasers of 286 systems,
may feel betrayed by the change in positioning.  Other customers, in the
low-end markets assigned to Windows, may feel left behind.  In contrast,
Macintosh is a graphically-based machine with a single OS ranging from low end
to high end.

The Niche for Windows

•  Windows is for use on systems with less than 2 MB RAM and less than a 30 MB
hard disk.  Microsoft said future releases of Windows will not include advanced
OS features such as threads, 32-bit flat memory, distributed processing, or
long file names.

•  IBM and Microsoft will make graphically-based applications available on OS/2
before Windows, after mid-1990.

•  Software developers who are not currently working on Windows applications are
urged to develop for OS/2 first.

The injured groups.  Although the announcements did not break a lot of ground,
they clarified a number of important gray areas.  IBM and Microsoft had left
some of these gray areas alone because clarifying them would anger some
customers and developers, including these

•  People who bought 286-based PCs.  When IBM and Microsoft announced OS/2 two
and a half years ago, they said it would be optimized for the 286 processor.
Now it is clear that the long-term direction of OS/2 is to the 386 chip.  Some
customers who bought 286-based machines like the IBM Model 50z may feel
betrayed.

•  Windows developers.  Microsoft had a choice between upsetting small
third-party developers of Windows software, and upsetting IBM and the big
software developers who did not work in Windows.  Microsoft chose to jettison
the small developers.  Although we still think Windows will be successful for
some time, IBM/Microsoft have said that it is not as strategic as OS/2.  This
could discourage customers from choosing Windows, thereby reducing the returns
to Windows software vendors.

The Apple Advantage.  Apple is maintaining a consistent architecture.
Macintosh does not force customers through the sort of disruptive transitions
now being faced by PC buyers.  In particular, the evolution of Macintosh does
not abandon entire classes of customers the way the OS/2 will abandon the 286.
System 7, which will ship at about the same time as OS/2 2.0, has a compelling
advantage over OS/2 2.0.  System 7.0 will run on all Macintoshes, and is
compatible with existing software.

Please see part 6